Heterogeneous Wireless Sensor Networks (HWSN) Management

Heterogeneous Wireless Sensor Nedeucerks (HWSN) directionA chance upon Management Establishment project in Heterogeneous Wireless Sensor Networks (HWSN)Premamayudu B, Venkata rao K, and Suresh Varma PAbstract Key focussing is the one of the fundamental requirement for securing the hierarchical radio detector entanglements (HWSN) and also prevents adversarial activities. This paper presents a upstart pairwise recognize management evasion using matrix for HWSNs. In HWSN, bunch together headers ar more unchewable than gather components in all the resources handle power, storage, dialogue and treat data. This heterogeneity alleviates the overhead of cluster members during the detect weement. All the expensive computations shtup be given to cluster headers in the network. Comp ared with otherwise popular identify management schemes, our scheme has m any(pre zero(prenominal)inal) advantages in eat the resources. The experiment and outline express that our scheme can maintain the full network connectivity, unclouded configuration management, neighbor cluster members like a shot establish pairwise describes during the communication and reduce storage overhead.Keywords Pairwise report, Symmetric matrix, Heterogeneous Wireless Sensor Networks, Key establishment.1. IntroductionA wireless sensing element networks build with a large phone minute of sensors, which are equipped with batteries, sensing, communication unit, data processing and radio communication unit. At present any real time applications implementing on wireless sensor networks, like home automation, environment supervise, military or guarantor areas, targeting and target tracking systems, agriculture monitoring system and battlefield surveillance. However all the applications need protection in all the level of the sensor network. The wireless connectivity, the interaction among the sensor bosss, data gathering and query processing and physical protection. If the senso rs are equipped with built-in tamper-resistance tools, the memory chips are still suffering from various memory read-out vulnerabilities 1.Key management is the mechanism to provide the security in all the levels of the wireless sensor networks. Since sensor customers in WSNs have constrains in their computational power and memory capability and security. The solutions of traditional networks like computer networks, ad hoc networks, and wired networks are not suitable for WSNs. The goal of place management in WSNs is to solve the problem of creating, distributing and protecting those concealed differentiates. Hence, the feasible and reliable techniques for key management and distribution of these keys are of major importance for the security in WSNs.The trusted server scheme 9 is not suitable for sensor networks because there is no trusted groundwork in sensor networks. The self-enforcing scheme 10 is also not suitable due to the limited computation and vim resources of sensor nodes often make it undesirable to use public key algorithms, such as Diffie-Hellman key agreement. The third type of key agreement scheme is key pre-distribution. There exist a moment of key predistribution schemes which do not depend on a priori deployment knowledge. A naive solution is to allow all the nodes carry a master riddle key. This scheme does not exhibit desirable network resiliency if one node is compromised, the security of the entire sensor network will be compromised. other key pre-distribution scheme is to let each sensor carry N 1 secret pairwise keys 3, each of which is known only to this sensor and one of the other N 1 sensors (assuming N is the total number of sensors). The resilience of this scheme is perfect. plainly this scheme is impractical for sensors with an extremely limited amount of memory because N could be large. Moreover, adding new nodes to a pre-existing sensor network is difficult because the existing nodes do not have the new nodes keys . Eschenauer and Gligor 7, proposed a random key pre-distribution scheme each sensor node receives a random subset of keys from a large key space pool, to agree on a key for communication, two nodes find one common (shared) key within their subsets and use that key as their shared secret key. The problem with this scheme is that when we clunk a large key pool, the connectivity of the sensor networks becomes low. In this paper, we will pick pairwise key pre-distribution scheme as the basic scheme and develop this scheme on the deployment model and show that knowledge regarding the sensor deployment can help us improve the per beance of a pairwise key predistribution scheme.2. related WorkThe fundamental work is introduced by Blom, who proposed a KPS allowing any pair of nodes to establish pairwise key directly 12. The set of keys generated from A.G in Bloms Scheme as a key-space, Du et al.13 improved Bloms scheme using Vandermonde matrix G, and employing multiple key-space KPS.Nodes may be deployed following a pre-defined method in certain situations. In nodes deployment using pairplane 14, for example, sensors nodes are partitioned into a sequence of groups and dropped out of the pairplane sequentially as the airplane flies forward. It is easy to see that sensor groups that are dropped next to each other have a better lay on the line to be close to each other after deployment. By exploiting deployment knowledge in such situations, Du et al. 14 extensive Eschenauer-Gligors scheme and proposed a key management scheme. Du et al. raise extended the scheme in 13 and proposed a new KPS using deployment knowledge 15. Other relevant works include Eschenauer and Gligors random KPS 10, Chan et al.s q-composite random KPS 11, etc.3. Our Key Establishment Scheme in HWSNs3.1. Network ModelThere are three types of nodes in our key establishment scheme, namely mingy grade (BS), crowd Header (H-Sensor) and glob Member (L-Sensor). Base Station operated completely in se cured environment. In the case of H-Sensor and L-Sensor are not operated in the secure area. If the sensor nodes are captured by adversaries, whole substantial can be accessible. We adopt the uttermost energy cluster head (MECH) protocol for our network architecture 1. As shown in Figure 1, in the MECH architecture, the sensors automatically organized into some clusters and act as two types of nodes in the network cluster heads and cluster member nodes. In each cluster, one node as a H (H-Sensor) manages the its associated cluster and forward the information from member nodes to the base station (BS). MECH constructs clusters according to the radio signal range and the number of cluster nodes. The nodes distribution is more equally in all the clusters in the network. This distribution does not hand a certain threshold.BS Base StationH Cluster HeadL Cluster MemberFigure 1 Architecture of heterogeneous Sensor Networks3.2. Assumptions(i) All nodes are static(ii) for each one sensor has unique ID assigned by Base Station(iii) If a sensor is compromised, whole material in the node is accessible(iv)The Base Station can communicate with Cluster Heads3.3. Basic SchemeOur scheme is completely variant form the Bloms Scheme 12. This scheme is completely modified in the way of usage and generating matrices.3.3.1. System SetupThere are N sensor nodes to be deployed in the network including Cluster Heads and Base Station, and be the security parameter.Base Station selects N distinct key sow ins s1,s2,..,sN from the Finite Field GFq, where q is the prime number. Every seed si mapped with a identifier idi.Base Station generates a secret (+1)N matrix GG is a secret matrix in our scheme. It is flat with selected seed from the Finite Field GFq.3.3.2. Key pre-distribution(i) Base Station generates the secret rhombohedral matrix (+1)(+1) form GFq, and Computes the public matrix A=(D.G)T.(ii) Base Station pre loads each key seed si and its identifier idi to the ith sensor n ode including Cluster Heads and also stores ith row from the matrix A.3.3.3. Pairwise Key EstablishmentAfter deployment, each sensor node broadcast its key seed identifier idi to its neighbors. Any two neighbor nodes can establish pairwise keys directly. permit the ith node and the jth node want to establish a pairwise key to secure the communication channel. computing at ith nodeThe ith column of matrix G using its key seed si (si,si2,.,si+1)And (aj1,aj2,..,aj(+1)) be the jth row of the matrix A, which loaded before deployment by BS.The ith node calculates the pairwise key with jth node denoted as kji.kij=(aj1,aj2,..,aj(+1)). (si,si2,.,si+1)kij=computation at jth nodeThe jth sensor node calculate the jth column of matrix G using its key seed sj(sj,sj2,sj3,..,sj+1)And (ai1,ai2,..,ai(+1)) be the ith row of matrix A, loaded by the BS.The jth node calculate the pairwise key kij askij= It remains to show that kij=kij, because the matrix k=A.G is a symmetric matrix. i.e kij calculated b y the cluster member i is same as kij calculated by cluster member j.The same process is apply for cluster heads to establish pairwise key between them to establish secure communication.4. Implementation4.1. Setup PhaseLet the number of nodes in the network be 6(N=6), Secure Property =3, prime number q=29 and 6 distinct key seeds 5, 8, 15, 4, 2, 174.2. Key pre-distributionSecret Symmetric matrix (D), Secretly stored in the Base Station (BS).A=(D.G)T mod 29A=Once Matrix A is calculated, Base Station pre loads key seed and a row from the matrix A into sensor node establish on its identifier. The rows of matrix A represent the private keys of each node.4.3. Key genesisSuppose witness two nodes, node 1 and node 5 wish to communicate with each other. Then node 1 and 4 need to calculate the shared secret key(pairwise key). In order to calculate the pairwise key, node 1 will multiply the assigned row A(1) which is from A and column G(4) which is calculated from the seed key value of nod e 4. The seed key values is broadcasted each other during shared key generation. likewise node 4 multiplies its row A(4) with the seed key value of node 1.K1,4=2596 mod 29 =15K4,1=156905 mod 29=15It is observed that both nodes generate a common key and further communication between them will make use of the pairwise key. The matrix K represents as shown below has the symmetric nature, because of the matrix D. Hence any pair of nodes can have the common key such that Ki,j=Kj,i.K=(A.G) mod 295. Analysis5.1. Local ConnectivityLocal connectivity addresses the size of key space between any neighbors. In our scheme, any pair of nodes can directly establish the shared key, under assumptions noted in the proposed scheme. Our scheme local connectivity is 1.5.2. Resilience against node capture attacksOur scheme is providing -security property to the network. If more than nodes are compromised hence only it is achievable to calculate the keys of others, which means that to find the k symme tric matrix. Even -1 nodes compromised, it not possible to predicate the other node key seed values. Our scheme achieves a high level of resilience against node capture attacks.5.3. Computation ComplexityOur scheme needs 2+1 multiplication operations in the field of GFq multiplications to calculate a column of G matrix with given key seed and +1 multiplication to calculate the inner product of corresponding row-column pairs. Pairwise key establishment between neighbor nodes requires 2+1 multiplication operations. If the value is large to protect the network, it increases the computational complexity. We have made analysis between our scheme and Bloms scheme on the computations complexity. From Fig. 2 we can see computations effort for 6 nodes under different Finite Field (FGq) ranging from 0-50, 0-100, 0-150, 0-200, 0-250, 0-300, 0-350. The analysis carried out with the network size of 6 nodes and security property () 3.Figure 2. Computational Complexity for a Network with 6 nodes 5.4. Communication ComplexityIn pairwise key establishment phase, sensor nodes need to broadcast a key seed identifier idi. All the materials require to generate pairwise key are loaded in the sensor node before deployment. But other key establishment schemes should perform other phases to generate a shared key between neighbors like path key establishment, rekeying, and broadcasting row values from the public matrix A. It leads to more communication overhead. But in case of our scheme has very low communication overhead. Compare to space complexity, our scheme consuming little more space than other schemes 5,6. The space complexity depends on the value of , if the value is clean small, then space complexity is very similar to the other schemes.6. Conclusion This paper presents the new pairwise key establishment scheme for heterogeneous wireless sensor network using the symmetric propriety of matrices. Our scheme achieves very light communication and computation complexity. The n ature of heterogeneity made reasonable results in the analysis. In addition that, our scheme is updatable, scalable and secure against node capture attacks.References1 I. F. Akyildiz,W. Su, Y. Sankarasubramaniam, and E. Cayirci, 2002 ,A survey on sensor networks, IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 40, no. 8, pp. 102114,.2 R. Blom, 1985, An optimal kinsfolk of symmetric key generation systems, Advances in Cryptology, ser. 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