Aims and Purposes of Sentencing

Aims and Purposes of SentencingDiscuss, and comment, on the aims and employments of sentencing. To what extent argon they a reflection of sentencing currently practised by moves?A convict in law, according to the Oxford Dictionary of Law (2006) is whatsoever order made by a court when dealing with an wrongdoer with respect to his offense now goerned by the pitiful Justice hazard 2003Courts deal with metres choosing from a mix of contrastive aims for the judgment of conviction to nurture. There be six main types of aim when assessing the purpose of whatever sentence Retribution, Deterrence, lay waste to system, Rehabilitation, Restorative Justice and IncapacitationFirstly, retribution is where The Old Testaments an warmness for an eye and a tooth for a tooth crop of pay offness is taken. It takes the view that wrongdoers deserve to be penalise and satisfies the victims need for r eveningge. This create of penalisation is full of criticism, for congresswoman Maha tma Ghandi himself stated an eye for an eye go out make us all go blind. This highlights the disproportionate nature of retributivism. In the case of Sargeantretribution as a purpose of sentencing was de-applied in the crook courts where the judge statedThe Old Testament judgment of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth no bimestrial plays any part in our criminal lawThis shows how judges and parliament have moved away from this form of referee to early(a)s. However, in cases not to do with criminal law, much(prenominal) as Tort law or other scenerys of law that give damages, it could be construed that there is a retributive aspect of taking damages from someone who has wronged you. Granted this is a sort of reparative judge (discussed disappoint) but the linguistic rule is well the same.Deterrence is a similar form of justice to retributivism in that it attempts to maintain order through threats and fear. There be two forms of deterrence, general and individual. Th ey are fairly self explanatory, general is where the courts sentence firmly to dissuade the general criminal domain and individual is where the courts sentence heavily on the individual to supposedly make them not trust to commit crime anymore. An modeling of preventative sentencing behind be seen in the case of Storey. It was an attempt to make an example of the offender so as to stop others committing the same crime, in this case, robbery, statistics show that it only worked in the lilliputian term. An issue is that deterrence is disproportionate, and does not take into account the ca hold of crime. It assumes that the offender thinks rationally of his choices, which is not always the case.There has been much legislation and insurance policy to curtail judicial kickshaw with regard to deterrence in sentencing. For example the CJA 1991 stated that deterrence was not to be used as a means of lengthening a sentence. However, traditionally the courts have steered toward a det errent policy of sentencing, and in the face of opposed legislation they were not astir(predicate) to give that up easily. The CJA 1991 was so poorly written that Lord Taylor in the case of Cunninghammanaged to read partition 2 (2) (a) of the 1991 bet as followsThe purposes of a custodial sentence must primarily be to punish and to deter. Accordingly, the invent commensurate with the serious-mindedness of the offence must mean commensurate with the punishment and deterrence which the seriousness of the offence requires.This enabled judges to effectively disregard the statute(predicate) in such a manner that they could continue on problem as usual.There was also a government White stem in 1990 that came close to directly saying that deterrence was no commodiouser a valid consideration when sentencing. However, despite all of this deterrence has erst again emerged as a gravestone aim of sentencing courtesy of section 142 (1) (b) of the Criminal Justice Act (hereon CJA) 2003 where deterrence is one of the only purposes mentioned directly. cease Theory is a form of justice based around proportionality. The Swiss judiciary uses this as their main purpose for sentencing. It essentially means that the sentence must be proportionate to the culpability of the offender. The CJA 2003 includes culpability into judicial reasoning. A case of where Desert has been put into practice would be Lord pathway CJs justification of his lowering of the sentence for social security fraud. This is the case of Stewartwhere it was given(p) that the crime was non-violent, non-sexual and non-frightening. The Halliday Reportshows a large preference to Desert Theory as it emphasises the need to link severity of punishment with culpability and seriousness of the offence, so as to give a proportionate sentence.Problems with this form of precept are that there is an assumed blame factor on the offenders side, which does not take into account social situations when taken literally. The actual limits of proportionality are also contentious the key concept of proportionality itself is too turn out to divergent opinion. However, it could be interpreted that desert is a main principle for our system as the CJA 2003 incorporates much of what desert stands for into it i.e. mitigation and culpability.The concept of reclamation is also mentioned directly in CJA section 142. This principle recognises the need to lower future crime and reconviction. This form of justice views the sentence and the associated loss of emancipation as the real punishment it puts forward the concept that through cognitive training during this time of lost liberty crime ignore be reduced, such as with the Think First program and the What Works ethos unquestionable by Maguire and Priestley. It is particularly useful in cases dealing with drugs and alcohol abuse. However, long term studies have indicated that in other circumstances it is unlikely to be of much use, as was found by the noth ing worksenquiry project. A 1998 Home Office survey evaluated thatthere have been rattling few well-designed and carefully evaluated studies in this country of the effectiveness of programmes designed to reconstruct and reduce the risk of re-offending.This represents a warning that rehabilitation is a very(prenominal) niche area giving various so-called experts powers over who is allow out and who is not, based upon loose assertions that the offenders are better or not. However, it does keep on in the CJA 2003 section 142, but not as the sole rationale. The genial Health Act 1983, despite the previous 1998 report, still gives the courts jurisdiction over the mentally ill, and as addiction can be construed as a mental sickness then it is possible to infer that the government supports this form of sentencing in this context.The principle of making amends for ones crime is the idea of keynote justice.criminal justice should focus on restoring individual damage and repairing rupt ured social bonds a truly reparative system would seek the holistic restoration of the community approximately of these developments in this form of justice are to make sure the criminal does not profit from his crime, i.e. compensation. Others are more reparatory in nature, meaning criminals are put to work for little or no wages in an effort to rebuild a part of the community they have victimised, for example a vandal fixes broken street lights for his criminal damage. The Powers of the Criminal Courts Act 2000 can be seen to greatly support the use and amendment of differing forms of community reparative sentences and further conclusion is given to support reparation in the CJA 2003.However, various problems rise up when this form of justice is used. Firstly, it is disproportionate in nature, where a minor offence is committed a seemingly longer sentence of reparation depart be administered rather than a shorter jail term. The disproportionate side enters where if the offender does not conform then a much harsher sentence will be imposed upon them. This does not address the cause of crime and can never be used for violent offenders as to do so would be a gross injustice to the victim. Therefore as a rationale it can only ever be taken in certain circumstances.Incapacitation is where the offenders opportunity to commit crime is taken away, by removing key aspects of his liberty that facilitate the crime convicted. For example a dangerous number one wood is disqualified and electronically tagged. As a result of humanitarian issues, such as imposing a harsh curfew which may interfere with someones right to personal autonomy and personal life, this gives the result with this being a heavily prescribed form of rationale. It is mainly limited to repeat (career) criminals or those deemed to be dangerous courtesy of the CJA 2003 sections 224-229 criteria. Incapacitation could also be construed within mental illness cases as well. The Mental Health Act 1983 gives judges the opportunity to use various methods of incapacitation on mentally ill offenders.The primary power the court has is the Hospital Order in respect of section 37 of the 1983 Act. patronage the fact that this is a form of incapacitation in BirchMustill LJ explained that the intention of this was varied and meant to be humane. This principle of justice is held to be in the favour of the defendant, even though all liberty is removed by an order of the court. license can be further removed in the interests of protecting the publicusing a Restriction Order as of section 41 of the 1983 Act. A Home Office report however supports this when used on the mentally ill where practicable and appropriate.This would show that incapacitation is a form of justice that most governments find irresistible to direct judges upon when issuing Acts and policies on sentencing.The point that Ashworth makes is that the CJA 2003 incorporates all of these rationales in the consideration of sentencing. This is true. It would then also be true that there is a pick-and-mix element to judgement with regard to this Act. However, it is funny of the judiciary to state that this invites inconsistency. While the main thrust of this Act could be seen to be the Desert Theory, as there is much mention of different levels of blame, this would show that this gives judges the discretion they will need to achieve justice for all. It would be the assertion of this paper that the CJA 2003 invites consistency of judgement but allows for the discretion of the inconsistency of crime in its own chaotic nature.Table of StatutesCriminal Justice Act 2003Criminal Justice Act 1991Powers of the Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000Mental Health Act 1983